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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 25 July through 14 August 1961:

1. The situation in East Berlin and East Germany has reached a critical stage. If the recently introduced control measures remain in effect and are vigorously enforced, increasingly severe local demonstrations cannot be discounted; on the other hand the regime's extensive display of force and determination together with its initial success in preventing a violent reaction probably will deter any such popular outbursts and prevent a large-scale uprising. In contrast to the situation in June 1953, the regime has taken the initiative and the East Germans and the Soviets are making an all-out effort to intimidate the populace from starting any kind of uprising.

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2. We believe that barring developments in East Germany which could force a change in Soviet tactics, Khrushchev will adhere to his previous position and timetable and continue to seek negotiations prior to a separate treaty. However, Soviet willingness to endorse and support the new control measures may reflect a greater willingness to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany without prior negotiations with the West. Should events in East Germany and Berlin reach the point where direct Soviet military intervention is required, the USSR might consider a separate peace treaty as one way of salvaging some vestige of East German sovereignty and authority.

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